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Abstract
Ethnic favoritism is seen as antithetical to development. This paper provides
credible quantication of the extent of ethnic favoritism using data on road building
in Kenyan districts across the 1963-2011 period. Guided by a model it then examines
whether the transition in and out of democracy under the same president constrains
or exacerbates ethnic favoritism. Across the 1963 to 2011 period, we nd strong
evidence of ethnic favoritism: districts that share the ethnicity of the president
receive twice as much expenditure on roads and have four times the length of paved
roads built. This favoritism disappears during periods of democracy.
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1 Introduction
Ethnic favoritism refers to a situation where coethnics benet from patronage and public
policy decisions, and thus receive a disproportionate share of public resources, when
members of their ethnic group control the government. It has been argued by historians,
political scientists, and economists that this phenomenon has hampered the economic
performance of many countries, particularly in Africa (Bates 1983; Mamdani, 1996;
Easterly and Levine 1997; Herbst, 2000; Posner, 2005; Franck and Ranier, 2012).1 In
fact, the widespread belief among citizens that ethnic favoritism is prevalent can poison
local political culture and make the phenomenon self-sustaining (see Horowitzs 1985;
Esman 1994; Fearon 1999; La Porta et al 1999; Wamwere 2003; Chandra 2004; Padró i
Miquel 2007; Caselli and Coleman 2013).2 According to several of these accounts, ethnic
favoritism ultimately emerges because weak political institutions are unable to constrain
governments from discriminating among citizens. Therefore, to understand the recent
political and economic performance of many African countries, it is crucially important
to determine to what extent ethnic favoritism is prevalent, and whether the emergence
(or in many cases, re-emergence) of democracy has helped mitigate it.
In this paper we make two contributions. First, we quantify the extent of eth-
nic favoritism in public resource allocation in a representative African country for the
post-independence period. Second, we examine whether the transition into and out of
multiparty democracy a¤ects the extent of ethnic favoritism.
These issues have been di¢ cult to address so far due to a number of factors. To
begin with, it is challenging to determine which ethnic group is getting what share
of public expenditure. This problem is particularly acute in Africa where government
statistical agencies have been underfunded for decades, where data on the allocation of
government spending is typically patchy at best and where, even when the data does
exist, there is a reluctance to release disaggregated data that could allow the populace
to uncover evidence of ethnic favoritism. Moreover, estimation of ethnic bias requires
observing what happens with public expenditure when there are switches of the ethnic
group in power. In many African countries this is di¢ cult given the long tenures of
post-independence leaders and the fact that particular ethnic groups have tended to be
1Easterly and Levine (1997) present econometric evidence evidence that ethnic diversity is negatively
associated with economic growth. Mamdani (1996) argues that nation creation by colonists in Africa
left tribal allegiances largely intact which, in turn, made countries di¢ cult to govern in the post-colonial
world. Herbst (2000) points to improper design of national borders leading to ethnic strife and the
inability of African countries to develop the necessary scal capacity to support economic development.
For other recent studies linking ethnic composition with economic performance, see for instance Alesina
et al 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Alesina et al 2012; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Nunn and
Wantchekon 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2011.
2Horowitzs (1985) voluminous scholarly work highlights that ethnicity is a powerful force in the
politics of divided societies and observes that these have profound e¤ects on the prospects for democracy,
economic development and the distribution of public goods. Specically, Esman (1994) observes that
when an ethnic group gains control of the state, important economic assets are soon transferred to the
members of that community".
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dominant for extended periods. Finally, to estimate the impact of institutional changes
such as democratization on ethnic favoritism one would ideally observe switches between
democracy and autocracy under the same leader, which is far from common.
To address these di¢ culties we pick an appropriate context: road building across
Kenyan districts. This setting is attractive for a number of reasons. First, there is
dramatic ethnic segregation across districts in Kenya, which is the result of the design
of colonial era borders in the period before Kenyas independence in 1963. Each post-
independent district was dominated by a single ethnic group, and this pattern remains
stable over time. Therefore we can directly assess, using road spending or road construc-
tion by district, whether or not ethnic groups which shared the ethnicity of the president
disproportionately beneted from roads.
Second, road expenditure can be directly measured. We have carried out extensive
historical archival work to recover road expenditure data at the project level. This has
enabled us to construct district level panel data on road expenditure for all 41 Kenyan
districts across the entire post-independence period, 1963-2011. In addition, we have
constructed a panel of road presence in each of the 41 Kenyan districts using historical
maps. We can therefore cross-check the district road expenditure data (from the road
projects) with the district road construction data (from the maps). Having this level of
detailed data on two independent measures of the same public good is extremely rare in
low-income countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Third, roads are the largest single element of public expenditure in Kenya, constitut-
ing about 15% of total expenditure over our sample period. This is three times what the
Kenyan central government spends on health, education or water. Roads expenditure is
centrally allocated and a highly visible form of public investment and thus a prime area
for political patronage. Road building, therefore, represents an ideal setting in which to
carry out an analysis of ethnic favoritism.3
Fourth, the post-independence history of Kenya provides us both with switches in
the ethnicity of the president, and switches into and out of multiparty democracy under
the same president. During our study period, we observe (i) a transition into autocracy
from democracy under the rst President of Kenya (Jomo Kenyatta, an ethnic Kikuyu),
(ii) a transition from a Kikuyu President to a Kalenjin President (Daniel arap Moi)
under an autocratic regime (iii) a transition out of autocracy into democracy under Moi,
and (iv) a democratic succession of a Kalenjin President to a Kikuyu President (Mwai
Kibaki). These changes both in the ethnicity of the president and in the political regime
allow us to identify the e¤ect of political transitions on ethnic favoritism holding the
identity of the leader constant.
Fifth, as is apparent in Figure 1, democratic change in Kenya mirrors the pattern
3Furthermore, a new literature (see Michaels 2008; Donaldson 2012; Faber 2012) shows that, by facil-
itating trade, roads and other forms of transportation infrastrucuture can boost economic performance.
Better connected districts in Kenya might therefore carry a growth advantage.
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seen across Sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya, like many African countries, was reasonably
democratic post-independence in the 1960s, became autocratic in the 1970s and 1980s,
and then returned to democracy in the 1990s and 2000s. Our results for Kenya might
thus provide insights into the broader post-independence pattern of economic and polit-
ical development across Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, if we nd that democracy
has value in terms of imposing constraints on the executive (which in turns limits ethnic
favoritism), then this might help explain why economic growth has been higher in demo-
cratic (1960s, 1990s, 2000s) relative to autocratic (1970s, 1980s) periods. We return to
a discussion of this issue in the conclusion to this paper.
Our unique set-up therefore allows us to assess whether there is ethnic favoritism in
roads investment, to quantify the magnitude of this e¤ect, and to estimate the extent
to which favoritism is a¤ected by democratization. To help us interpret our results, we
set up a model of centralized presidential public resource allocation across districts. The
model shows how the degree of ethnic favoritism is determined by the constraints on
executive action that characterize di¤erent political regimes. Our empirical results can
therefore be directly linked to the magnitude of ethnic favoritism and to the constraints
on the executive as captured in the model, providing novel theoretically-grounded quant-
itative evidence on the extent of these phenomena.
What we nd is striking. Across the 1963 to 2011 period, Kenyan districts that
share the ethnicity of the president receive twice as much expenditure on roads and have
four times the length of paved roads built relative to what would be predicted by their
population share. This is unequivocal evidence of an extreme degree of ethnic favoritism.
However, these biases are not constant. While in periods of autocracy, coethnic districts
receive three times the average expenditure in roads and ve times the length of paved
roads, both these biases disappear entirely during periods of democracy. Thus, the
political regime is an important determinant of ethnic favoritism. We subject these
results to several robustness checks and show that they hold both with the project level
expenditure data and with the historical map data. Our results are also robust to using
di¤erent normalizations and measures of coethnicity.
These results suggest that even imperfectdemocratic institutions, like those found
in Kenya during the 1960s, 1990s and 2000s, have value by imposing constraints on the
executive.4 A key insight from our theoretical model is that these constraints prevent
politicians from taking decisions which, though optimal for the leader concerned, run
counter to citizens interests and economic e¢ ciency. In the context of the many African
countries where presidential power has an ethnic base, this may translate to lessened
favoritism towards coethnics during periods of democracy as political leaders are forced
to share public goods across the wider population.
Closer examination of recent Kenyan history sheds light on how the re-emergence
4 Indeed, we show that the executive constraint parameter derived from our model (and estimated
using our data) moves in parallel with Polity IV measures of constraints on the executive.
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of multiparty democracy in the 1990s changed the nature of constraints on Kenyan
leaders and altered the allocation of public resources. Multiparty democracy heralded
an increase in mass political participation as well a lessening of constraints on popular
expression, including by increasingly vocal civil society groups. There was a reduction in
press censorship, and an explosion of private print and electronic media. These changes
led to far greater scrutiny of the actions of executive authorities starting in the 1990s,
which helps make sense of why ethnic favoritism was dramatically reduced during periods
of multiparty democracy.
This paper contributes to a small but growing body of studies trying to estimate the
extent of ethnic favoritism. Following on Kudamatsus (2012) work, Frank and Rainer
(2012) use the Demographic and Health Surveys to construct retrospective time-varying
ethnic-level measures of educational and health attainment for 18 countries. They show
that the ethnic identity of the president is correlated with higher coethnic attainment
in these dimensions. Kramon and Posner (2012) use a similar technique to focus on
the Kenyan case and trace whether the ethnic identity of key ministers matters for
education. Hodler and Raschky (2011) use light images from satellites to see whether
the birth regions of national leaders are favored when they take power and whether
this e¤ect is more muted under democracy versus autocracy.5 Our paper advances this
literature by directly measuring public investment in road building rather than relying
on living standard outcomes such and health and education attainment where many
factors (beyond public investment) are involved in determining the outcome measure.
Developing a framework of presidential allocation of public good across districts allows
us to link constraints on the executive with ethnic favoritism. We can derive estimates of
these constraints from the model (for di¤erent presidential regimes) which we can then
compare to the Polity IV constraints on the executive score for Kenya across time. The
construction of independent series on road expenditure and road length for all Kenyan
districts across the 1963 to 2011 is thus a key contribution of the paper. This data,
coupled with changes in presidential ethnicity and in political regime is critical to our
ability to determine the extent of ethnic favoritism in road building and whether it is
a¤ected by moves into and out of multiparty democracy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoret-
ical framework. Section 3 presents the historical background on roads and politics in
Kenya and the data collected. Section 4 presents the methods, results and discusses
and interprets these ndings in light of our model and recent Kenyan history. Section 5
concludes and links our results to the broader literature on the e¤ect of ethnic diversity
on economic growth.
5Morjaria (2012) looks at whether deforestation and land encroachment in Kenyan forests became
more or less pronounced after the return to multi-party democracy in 1992.
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2 Theoretical Framework
Consider a repeated economy populated by innitely lived agents that discount the
future at rate . There is a continuum of citizens of size 1. Citizens belong to one of
two ethnic groups, i 2 fA;Bg, and the population share of group A is A. These two
groups live in two separate districts, and each group also has an innitely countable
set of potential country presidents. At any point in time, one of these presidents is in
power and they are all identical except for their ethnic identity. We thus have two types
of presidents, j 2 fA;Bg. The president in power decides on taxation  , and on the
amount of district-specic public goods to be provided. Denote by ij the per capita
public goods expenditure that group i receives if the president belongs to group j.
For simplicity, we assume that the president can only charge a lump-sum tax  on all
citizens and cannot use taxation to discriminate across groups.6 The president can direct
spending to his preferred district, but is limited by institutional and societal constraints.
Following Besley and Persson (2010) we capture these constraints on the executive in a
simple way as follows:
ij    AAj + BBj (1)
where  2 [1;1] denotes the weakness of constraints on the executive. This formulation
ensures that per capita spending in favor of group i cannot exceed average per capita
spending by more than a factor . If  = 1, institutions are so weak that they do not
constrain the president in any way and all spending can be targeted to one district. At
the opposite extreme,  = 1 implies that no discrimination across districts is possible.
We assume that electoral institutions are also relatively weak, and the active sup-
port of ones coethnics is necessary to keep power.7 As in Padró i Miquel (2007), we
assume that an acting president who receives the support of his ethnic group has strong
incumbency advantage and stays in power with probability . In contrast, if the acting
president does not receive coethnic support, he loses power with probability 1. In this
case, an open succession follows, and the new ruler belongs to the same ethnic group
as the ousted president with probability , for 1 >    > 0. Since transitions are
often weakly institutionalized and may involve coups and violence, we assume that in
the period while such a transition is being resolved, the state cannot perform its public
spending or taxation functions.8
6We make this assumption for a number of reasons. First, the empirical evidence is mixed on African
governmentscapacity to e¤ectively discriminate with taxation (see Bates 1981 and Kasara 2007), so this
simplifying assumption is a useful benchmark. Moreover,  here includes legal taxes and also indirect
ways of extracting rents. The assumption of no tax discrimination is therefore equivalent to assuming
that the cost of rent-seeking falls equally on all citizens. For a similar model in which discrimination in
taxation is possible, see Padró i Miquel (2007).
7To capture a wide variety of political institutions, we do not take a strong stance on what this
support means in practice. It can range from ethnic voting for the appropriate candidate to exerting
violence in order to deny other ethnic groups the full exercise of their democratic rights.
8 In this simple formulation, the weakness of electoral rules is captured by    . A large di¤erence
captures a system where the personality of the ruler is very important, as would be the case if the ruling
clique can easily manipulate the political contest. If this di¤erence is zero, the mapping between group
6
We assume that presidents maximize the amount of resources they can extract by
being in power. Each period, the amount of resource extraction by a leader of type j is
given by
A
 
   Aj+ B     Bj ;
which, for each group, takes into account the taxes taken in and the expenditures on
public goods. Presidents receive zero utility when out of power and, for simplicity, we
assume that once they are ousted they cannot come back to power.
The citizens of group i pay taxes  and enjoy public expenditure ij , which gives
them the following simple instantaneous utility:
R(ij)   ;
where R() is increasing and concave and satises R0(0) = 1 and R0(1) = 0.9 Denote
by !t 2 fA;Bg a state variable that captures the ethnic type of the president at time t.
The timing of the game, given !t, is as follows:
1. The president announces the policy vector Pt = (!t ; A!t ; B!t)
2. The citizens of group !t decide whether to support the leader, st = 1 or not st = 0
3. If st = 1, Pt is implemented and payo¤s are realized. Next period starts with
!t+1 = !t with probability . With probability 1    the president loses power
and the next president is from the other group.
4. If st = 0, the leader is immediately ousted and the transition policy vector P =
(0; 0; 0) is implemented. After the transition, with probability  the new ruler be-
longs to the same group as the ousted ruler and hence !t+1 = !t. With probability
1   the new president belongs to the other group.
We solve for the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of the game. Strategies can
therefore only be conditioned on the payo¤ relevant state variables and past play within
the stage game. Note that the only payo¤-relevant state variable is !t.
The following proposition, proven in the appendix, characterizes policy in the unique
MPE.
Proposition 1 Assume  < maxf 1
A
; 1
B
g. There is a unique MPE in which
1. (1) is binding for both types of presidents
power and electoral power is not mediated by the current ruler. For simplicity and to save on notation,
we assume that both ethnic groups are symmetric in political terms. This might, of course, not be true
in reality and both  and  could di¤er across groups, capturing di¤erences in their populations, internal
structure, or hold on power. Allowing for this will not change any of the results of interest (see Padró i
Miquel, 2007).
9Note that this formulation implies that the optimal path of public expenditure equalizes expenditures
per capita across both districts.
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2. R0(ii) = R0(jj) = 1
3. ji = ii 1 
i
j
and ij = jj 1 
j
i
In the unique MPE of the game, the president benets his own group as much as he
can, and he does so in order to be able to increase taxes. Increasing patronage to his
group allows him to increase taxes for both groups, and hence the rents he can extract
increase. In equilibrium, this logic makes constraint (1) bind. This constraint forces the
president to provide public goods to non-coethnics, which reduces his rents. The more
patronage he is forced to provide to the other group (i.e., the smaller  is), the less he
can appropriate and hence the lower the incentives to manipulate public good provision
to his advantage. For this reason, the amount of public goods provided to the presidents
coethnics is increasing in .
In the empirical section, we use the fact that (1) is binding in equilibrium to provide
empirical estimates of  across di¤erent regimes in Kenyas recent political history. There
is a direct relationship between our empirical estimates and the constraints on the ex-
ecutive modeled in our framework. For a group A president in power (without loss of
generality), we will estimate
 =
AA   BA
AAA + BBA
which can be rewritten as10:
 = 1 + (1  A)
3 Background and Data
3.1 Districts and Ethnicity in Kenya
Kenyas population comprises a mix of more that forty ethnic groups. According to
the 1962 Population Census, conducted immediately prior to independence, Kenyas
main ethnic groups were the Kikuyu (18.8%), Luo (13.4%), Luhya (12.7%) and Kalenjin
(10.8%). The shares of these main ethnic groups have remained very stable since then
despite the fact that the national population has increased nearly vefold (see Appendix
Table 1, Panel A).
While these ethnic groups predate the arrival of the British in what is today Kenya,
boundaries between them were not clearly delineated and have been described as uid"
in the pre-colonial period (Sheri¤, 1985). Leading up to the British colonial era, there
were few centralized political structures in the interior of Kenya. Instead, authority was
typically personal and local, often a function of lineage, age and wealth and not of ethnic
allegiance (for illustrations, see Herbst (2000) and Mamdani (1996)). The regions new
10The transformation uses the fact that AA = 
 
AAA + BBA

and BA =
[AAA+BBA] AAA
B
to generate the expression  =  1
B
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British rulers, however, imposed the provincial administration model in the early 20th
century, a structure that was used throughout colonies of British Africa. The country
was divided into provinces, provinces were in turn divided into districts and districts into
divisions, and further into locations and sub-locations. The boundaries of these localities
were based in part on the economic needs of white settlers, but a second important
consideration was the administrations understanding of African ethnic groups.
In the early years of the Colony, districts were clearly dened in racial terms. The
White Highlands, the most suitable land for agriculture, was declared Crown prop-
erty and reserved for white settlers only, despite their substantial pre-existing African
populations. African reserves, on the other hand, were for indigenous Africans. There
were restrictive rules on the residential mobility of Africans who were working as hired
labor or squatterson the land now owned by the whites (land which had previously
belonged to them). Further, all Africans had to carry an identication card to travel
outside their allotted reserves.
The creation of these administrative units, initially for racial segregation, laid the
foundation for ethnic politics in later years. From the early years of the Colony, there
was di¤erentiation and targeting of public policies to di¤erent districts depending on
their agriculture potential and link to trade, which implied di¤erential treatment for
the various ethnic groups. As the ethnic dimension became increasingly salient, district
borders were redrawn to accommodate the demands of local African chiefs and notables.
Boundary commissions were formed to incorporate these evolving views. As we see in
Appendix Figure 1, district boundaries in 1909 bear little relation to the 1963 ethnic
boundaries at independence. But by 1933 this situation had begun to change. The align-
ment of interests between the British and local chiefs both of whom preferred greater
district ethnic homogeneity meant that 1933 district borders now begin to resemble
1963 ethnic boundaries. Things move further in this direction so that by 1963 district
and ethnic boundaries tightly coincide (see Appendix Figure 1). At independence, 38
out of 41 districts in Kenya had a single ethnic group constituting more than 50% of
the population, and this remains the case up until the present. The only districts that
were not dominated by a single ethnic group were Nairobi, Mombasa and Trans-Nzoia;
Nairobi and Mombasa were (and are) the two largest cities in Kenya and Trans-Nzoia
is a highly urbanized district. Economic opportunities in these agglomerations drew in
individuals from many tribes as migrants.
In our analysis, we use the 1963 district boundaries. Districts in Kenya, in e¤ect,
serve as stable ethnic markers thus allowing us to precisely assign expenditures or road
length to particular ethnic groups. This, in turn enables us to establish whether districts
that share the ethnicity of a given president receive more road investment and also to
establish whether this bias di¤ers across democratic versus autocratic periods.
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3.2 Ethnic Politics in Kenya
There was already di¤erentiation and targeting of public policies to di¤erent ethnic
groups in the colonial period. The Kikuyus had the most prolonged exposure to dis-
criminatory British policies, as large areas of their original homeland was alienated
to become the White Highlandsand many were forced into squatterstatus. There
was increasing discontent within the Kikuyu group as internal inequalities rose, contrib-
uting to support for the so-called Mau-Mau uprising against the Europeans as well
as against those Africans who worked closely with the colonial authorities (Anderson
2005).
The Mau-Mau uprising brought with it a state of emergency in Kenya and set the
stage for Kenyas independence. Following the Lancaster House Conference in 1960, the
Legislative Council was restructured to allow for an African majority as well as to allow
for the legal formation of African political parties. In May 1960, the Kenya Africa Na-
tional Union (KANU) was formed and led by Jomo Kenyatta (an ethnic Kikuyu). Soon
after, driven by the fear of Kikuyu and Luo domination, the Kenya Africa Democratic
Union (KADU) was formed. KADU was composed largely by members of numerically
smaller ethnic groups, and led by Daniel arap Moi, an ethnic Kalenjin. These parties
contested in the rst post-independence election of 1963. KANU won the election con-
vincingly and in less than two years KADU MPs had all joined KANU, resulting in the
temprorary end of opposition representation in Parliament.
In the mid-1960s, however, several members of KANU defected to a new left-leaning
Luo-led party, the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), which opposed the perceived growing
conservatism and pro-Western orientation of Kenyatta and the KANU leadership. How-
ever, the anti-communist logic of the Cold War meant that the KPU was banned in 1969,
ostensibly on national security grounds. This banning institutionalized the single-party
autocracy and it is clearly captured in measures of democratic political institutions such
as Polity IV.11 As shown in Figure 1, the Polity IV score for Kenya falls from 0 to -7
at this point. The banning of KPU also arguably marked the beginning of unchecked
Kikuyu political domination (Widner, 1992).
Kenyatta died unexpectedly of natural causes in 1978 and Moi (his former Vice-
President, and a Kalenjin) took power, as specied in the Constitution. Moi continued
in the footsteps of Kenyatta and further consolidated the one-party state. However,
following an attempted coup in 1982 led by Kikuyu o¢ cers, he switched from a Kikuyu-
Kalenjin coalition to an alliance between Kalenjins, Luhyas and numerically smaller
groups, similar to the KADU alliance he had once led. Heads of parastatal enterprises,
the military, police and the security apparatus were rapidly replaced with Kalenjins
(Widner 1992).
The early 1990s saw an increase in both internal and external pressures for African
11Recall that polity is on a -10 to +10 scale, with scores below -5 typically considered autocratic.
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leaders to introduce democracy, with the end of the Cold War being a catalyst for this
change (Barkan 1994). The suspension of overseas development assistance from the Paris
Group of Donors forced Moi to legalize opposition parties, and Kenya held multiparty
elections in 1992 for the rst time since the 1960s. However, while Moi had amended
the constitution to allow for multiparty competition, in parallel he had also successfully
consolidated the strength of the O¢ ce of the President. His abuse of the state machinery
and widespread vote fraud, together with the inability of the opposition to coordinate
on a single candidate, handed Moi victory in both the 1992 and the 1997 multiparty
elections.
Despite this electoral fraud and abuse of the newly established democratic political
institutions, the return to multiparty democracy is widely accepted to have brought
signicant changes in the nature of Kenyan politics and civil society. The emergence of
a freer press, including private ownership of media, the growth of civil society forums
and of parliamentary accountability committees, as well as a reduction in blatant human
rights abuses by the security apparatus, were all arguably triggered by the emergence
of political competition. These trends are not unique to Kenya, as illustrated by the
Africa-wide changes in democratic governance in Figure 1. The process put in motion
by these civil society changes helped make possible the relatively free national election
of 2002, which was won by the opposition for the rst time, namely by Mwai Kibaki,
an ethnic Kikuyu (under the NARC party), marking the rst democratic transition of
power in independent Kenya (Posner 2005). Moi himself did not run for President in the
2002 elections, adhering to the constitutional provision barring a third term in o¢ ce.
Kenyas emerging democracy has been tested since 2002. The social and political
salience of ethnicity in Kenya has not diminished. The 2007 general election was tightly
fought between the incumbent Kibaki (an ethnic Kikuyu) and Raila Odinga (an ethnic
Luo), who was in coalition with leading Kalenjin gures. Leading up to the election, exit
polls all pointed to a relatively close but clear Odinga victory, but the electoral results
kept Kibaki in power amid credible claims of electoral fraud. This resulted in nearly two
months of widespread ethnic violence, with thousands killed and hundreds of thousands
displaced from their homes (Gibson and Long 2009).
This brief discussion of recent Kenyan political history shows that, while represent-
ative of broader African political trends, the case of Kenya is particularly helpful for
our analysis. More specically, there are two key ingredients that enable us to identify
ethnic favoritism and its relationship with multiparty democracy. Firstly, the altern-
ation of power (as illustrated in Figure 2) between Kikuyu and Kalenjin leaders over
time allows us to test for ethnic favoritism and quantify its magnitude. In practice,
we test for favoritism by estimating whether districts that share the presidents ethni-
city received more roads investments. Secondly, within ethnic ruling periods there are
switches between autocracy and multiparty democracy, allowing us to test whether the
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existence of democratic institutions (even if imperfect) constrains or exacerbates ethnic
favoritism.
3.3 Roads Investment Data in Kenya
Road building is the single largest development expenditure item in Kenyas Annual De-
velopment Budget.12 Over the period of study, 1963-2011, new road development budget
on average represents 15.2% of the total central governments development budget, com-
pared to gures of 5.5%, 5.7% and 6.5% for expenditures in education, health and water,
respectively. Unlike other forms of development expenditure (e.g., schools and water)
that derive in large part from local village funding (called harambee funding in Swahili),
funding for road expenditure is almost entirely provided by the central government. By
looking at the distribution of road spending and road construction across districts across
time we are thus able to test for ethnic favoritism by the central government.
In theory, the decision-process behind road construction is partially bottom-up. The
Provincial and District Commissioners are supposed to pass up requests for projects to
the Ministry of Public Works.13 The Ministry of Public Works handles these requests
and prepares a national road building strategy. The Ministry of Finance then oversees
and resolves competing claims from the di¤erent ministries and actual road projects are
then implemented. However, it is important to note that this process takes place under
strict oversight exercised by the O¢ ce of the President at all stages. In fact, Provincial
Commissioners themselves are nominated by the O¢ ce of the President, which guaran-
tees their loyalty by rewarding them with wide-ranging authority in their province.14
Given the high visibility of road projects both in terms of physical infrastructure as well
as large nancial outlays, it is likely that the president himself took a personal interest
in major road projects.
Our main measure of road building is expenditures on new roads annually by district
during 1963-2011, obtained from the Kenya National Development budget reports. This
is technical data compiled by project engineers that details the expenditure on a com-
prehensive list of individual road projects on an annual basis (i.e., a paved road from
location A to location B through location C, at total cost X). When a road project spans
locations in more than one district, we use GIS to understand the layout of the road pro-
ject and the relative kilometers in each district. We then decompose expenditure across
the relevant districts assuming an equal distribution of costs along the construction of
the total length of the road (see Appendix 1 for greater detail on the construction of
12Kenyas Total Annual Budget in our study period is composed of the Development Budget and
the Recurrent Expenditure. Unfortunately the Recurrent Expenditure is only reported as national
aggregates.
13The Ministry of Public Works was in charge of planning and building roads from 1963-1978, in 1979-
1988 the road portfolio moved to the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and in 2008-2011 a
separate Ministry of Roads was created.
14As a result, there was disproportionate representation from the presidents ethnic group in the share
of both provincial and district commissioners in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (see Barkan and Chege 1989).
12
this data series).
A convenient feature of roads is that they are easy to observe on the ground. Our
second measure of road investment thus comes from Michelin Maps, which capture the
actual physical extent of paved roads. Paved roads account for the majority of road ex-
penditures, and their spread can be reliably tracked across our period. As these maps are
made by French engineers in Paris assisted by Michelin o¢ ces (mainly gas stations and
tire outlets) throughout East Africa, they are an independent non-governmental source
of data on road investment. This data should therefore not be a¤ected by the concern
that road spending, as reported by the government, might not be accurately reported.
It is simply a measure of the physical manifestation of paved roads. Digitization of the
Michelin maps thus provides us with an independent check on whether there is ethnic
favoritism in road building and whether such favoritism is a¤ected by democracy.
The limitation of this second source of data is the availability of these maps only
in some years and only until 2002, resulting in a smaller sample. In particular, maps
were produced for the following years: 1961, 1964, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1981,
1984, 1987, 1989, 1992 and 2002. In order to use the Michelin Maps to create a GIS
dataset, we initially start with a Global GIS map containing contemporary roads. We
then use the various maps to recreate the evolution of roads backwards in time. Due
to the consistency of legend labels on paved roads, we are able to create a district-year
panel dataset of the length of paved roads by splicing the historical road maps with the
district boundaries.
Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the road network across key years in Kenyas political
history. The year 1964 is the rst year the Michelin map is available post-independence
and shows the colonial interest in connecting the most agriculturally fertile area of Kenya
(the White Highland areas) to Nairobi; the maps of 1969-1979 illustrate the Kenyatta
period, 1969 being the end of multiparty democracy and the beginning of the single-party
state in Kenya. The year 1979 is immediately after the unexpected death of Kenyatta
and the beginning of Mois (ethnic Kalenjin) single party era. The year 1992 serves to
illustrate the end of Mois single party era and the beginning of multiparty democracy.
Finally, 2002 illustrates the stock of road development at the end of Mois multiparty
era.
Comparison of the paved road maps for 1979 and 1992 gives a rst visual indication
of ethnic favoritism. The paved road network in and around the green Kikuyu districts
appears largely frozen between these two years. In contrast the network in and around
the pink Kalenjin areas expands dramatically. After 1992, in contrast, the expansion in
and around the green and pink areas is much more equal.
Panel A of Appendix Table 2 provides summary statistics for both the main outcomes
of interest (road development expenditures per population share, using project data) and
the secondary measure (paved road construction per population share, using maps data).
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Note that the di¤erence in the number of observations is driven by the di¤erent data
sources: road expenditure data is available every year between 1963-2011, while the
maps are less frequent.
We normalize the road expenditure measure taking into account population. More
specically, the main outcome variable in the analysis is the share of road expenditure
received by a district (out of the total national road development budget that year) di-
vided by the population share of the district in the national population (in 1962). This
summary statistic has a natural interpretation: a value of one implies that a district
received road spending that is exactly proportional to its population.15 Values greater
than (less than) one denote spending that is above (below) the national average. Spe-
cically, a value of two for this measure denotes a district that is receiving twice as
much road spending as the national per capita average, while a value of 1.3 denotes
expenditures 30% above the national per capita average. To be more precise, let road
spending in district d and year t be denoted by EXPdt and district population in 1962
be POPd;1962, while total national road spending is EXPt and national population in
1962 is POP1962. The main road spending measure can be expressed as:
roaddt =

EXPdt
POPd;1962


EXPt
POP1962

We construct a parallel measure for paved road construction (in km) per capita by
district, using a measure of paved road length per capita in the district divided by average
paved road length per capita nationally, as an alternative district road outcome. This
measure has the same interpretation, with one denoting road construction on par with
the national average, and values greater than one denoting additional construction. As
a robustness check, we also explore normalizing district road spending by district land
area.
In relating these measures of road investment to whether districts are coethnic with
the president (as dened by the districts population of the presidents ethnic group being
above 50%), we control for a number of other factors that may a¤ect the placement of
roads. These variables are measured at the district level, including population, area,
urbanization rate, formal earnings, formal employment as share of total population,
value of cash crops, whether the district lies along the pre-existing Mombasa-Nairobi-
Kampala rail and road corridor, whether the district is a national border district, and
the distance to Nairobi. All these controls are measured either just at independence or
soon after, depending on data availability.16
15This empirical benchmark lines up with our theoretical model where the optimal path of public
expenditure equalizes expenditures per capita across districts. Deviations from this benchmark are
therefore interpretable as evidence of ethnic favoritism.
16Note that we obtain district population and urbanization rates from the reports of the Population and
Housing Census in 1962. District area (sq km) is estimated using GIS tools on the 1963 administrative
boundaries. We use the annual Statistical Abstracts of Kenya to reconstruct total district employment
14
4 Methods and Results
4.1 Methods
We seek to estimate the relationship between the ethnicity of the president and public
expenditures in districts demographically dominated by his coethnics. In the period
under examination, we have Kikuyu presidents (1963-1978 and 2003-2011) and Kalenjin
presidents (1979-2002). There are seven Kikuyu dominant districts and six Kalenjin
dominant districts, out of 41 in total. We present our results using two approaches, a
graphical approach and a regression approach.
In our rst approach, we graphically examine how the ratio of a districts share of
road spending or road construction relative to its population share (i.e. roaddt) varies
in the post-independence period. We divide districts in two ways. First by whether or
not, in a given year, the majority ethnic group in a district is the same as that of the
president, as discussed above. This allows us to visually examine whether or not districts
that are coethnic with the president receive a higher share of national spending on roads
relative to their share in the national population. We are particularly interested in
analyzing whether this bias is more or less pronounced in democratic periods relative to
autocratic periods. Second, we examine the evolution of ethnic majority of Kikuyu and
Kalenjin districts. Since all Kenyan presidents were either ethnic Kikuyu or Kalenjin
during the 1963-2011 study period, this allows us to examine what happens to road
spending in districts when they shift in and out of being coethnic with the president.
A focus here again is on whether being coethnic during autocratic periods results in
districts attracting a higher share of road resources relative to democratic periods. This
comparison is of particular interest as the transition from democracy to autocracy in 1969
took place under the same president, as did the transition from autocracy to democracy
in 1992.
In the regression approach, our main estimating equation takes the following form:
roaddt = d + t + (coethnic districtdt)
+(coethnic districtdt  democracyt) + (Xd1963  [t  1963]) + udt
where the dependent variable is the road spending or road construction measure for year
t and district d as described above.17 To capture coethnicity with the president, we use
an indicator variable (coethnic districtdt) that takes a value of one for districts where
(available in 1963) and total district earnings (in 2000 USD, available for 1966) in the formal sector. The
Development Plan of Kenya 1964-1970 reports cash crop production (co¤ee, tea and sisal) at the district
level for the year 1964-1965. We then use the 1965 export price in 2000 USD (FAO 2011) to calculate
the district total value of cash crop exports in 1965. We use GIS tools to create: (i) an indicator variable
whose value is one if any part of the district is on the Mombasa-Nairobi-Kampala rail and road corridor,
(ii) an indicator variable whose value is one if the district borders Uganda or Tanzania, (iii) a variable
capturing the Euclidian distance (in km) from each district centroid to Nairobi.
17For both spending and construction we have 41 districts as dened by the 1963 district boundaries.
For spending we have annual data for 49 years and hence our sample is 2009 observations. For paved
road construction there are 11 Michelin maps between 1963 and 2002 and hence 451 observations.
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at least 50% of the population has the same ethnic a¢ liation as the serving president.
The democracyt term is an indicator variable which takes a value of one during periods
of multiparty democracy (1963-1969 and 2003-2011, see Figure 4). Xd1963 is a vector
of baseline demographic, economic and geographic variables all obtained in the early to
mid 1960s that might a¤ect road spending and construction. We interact these initial
conditions with linear time trends [t-1963] to allow their impact over time to vary across
di¤erent districts. The regression also controls for district xed e¤ects (d), year xed
e¤ects (t) and standard errors are clustered at the district level.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Graphical Analysis
The rst results are presented in Figure 4. We plot our average roaddt measure for
districts that are coethnic with the president in year t and for those that are not. The
solid vertical lines, in 1969 and 1992, capture regime transitions away from multiparty
democracy and back to multiparty democracy, respectively. The broken vertical lines, in
1979 and 2002, capture presidential transitions. Two interesting patterns emerge. The
rst is that during periods of autocracy (basically, the 1970s and 1980s) the ratio of
district share of road expenditures to district share of population is always above one for
coethnic districts and below one for non-coethnic districts, which is strongly indicative
of ethnic favoritism.18 The second is that during periods of multiparty democracy (ba-
sically, the 1960s, 1990s and 2000s) the ratio is consistently lower and tends to be near
one on average for both types of districts, implying little or no favoritism.
Three transitions in Figure 4 are particularly noteworthy. The rst is the rapid
post-1969 rise of average roaddt from 1 to above 2. Even with the same president
in power (Kenyatta), the switch from democracy to autocracy leads to road spending
more than doubling in coethnic districts over the course of a few years. The second
is that this favoritism is maintained and intensied after 1979, despite the fact that
the set of districts that are coethnic with the president is now completely distinct from
those pre-1979. The third is that when democracy returns in 1992 the roaddt measure
gradually falls from above 2 to around 1 even though the same president (Moi) is in
place. Democracy clearly has value in terms of spreading the single biggest component
of public expenditures in Kenya more evenly across districts dominated by di¤erent
ethnic groups. The stark 1-2-1 pattern we observe in presidential coethnic districts
as Kenya enters and then exits autocracy is extremely di¢ cult to square with spending
being driven mainly by concerns of economic e¢ ciency.
Only two ethnic groups, the Kikuyus and the Kalenjins, produced presidents during
the study period. Figure 5 categorizes districts by whether the majority of the district
18Note that the fact that the coethnic line rises to nearly 3 whereas the non-coethnic line falls to only
around 0.8 is due to the fact that the bulk of the districts in a given year are not coethnic with the
president.
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population is Kikuyu, Kalenjin or from another ethnic group. Kikuyu districts receive
road spending in line with their population share during the early democratic period.
Following the banning of opposition political parties in 1969, road spending concentrates
in these districts, rising to more than double that predicted by population share. This
trend of favoring Kikuyu districts ends when the Kikuyu president (Kenyatta) dies in
1978. In fact, there is a striking decline in Kikuyu district road funding, and a corres-
ponding increase in Kalenjin road funding timed exactly after Kenyattas death in 1978,
suggesting that Moi had the authority to rapidly target road resources to his coethnic
districts.
The rise in spending on Kalenjin districts is truly meteoric: roaddt rises from around
0.5 pre-1978 to close to 3 post-1978, representing a six-fold increase in relative road
spending per capita in these districts. This highly elevated roaddt level is maintained
throughout the Moi autocratic period, as the Kikuyu roaddt falls back down towards
unity. The return of democracy under Moi in 1992 seems to reduce his ability to maintain
this high degree of ethnic favoritism, and the Kalenjin district roaddt measure drifts
back down towards unity as democracy gradually strengthens. Diminished favoritism
for districts that are coethnic with the president during periods of democracy is also
associated with greater spending for the majority of districts in Kenya which are neither
majority Kikuyu nor Kalenjin. As Figure 5 demonstrates, the otherethnic districts
line has a U-shaped pattern, being close to unity in the 1960s, then falling below
unity in the 1970s and 1980s, and rising back towards unity in the 1990s and 2000s.
Democracy seems to have a leveling inuence in ensuring that Kenyan districts receive
roads resources roughly in line with their share of population irrespective of whether or
not they share the ethnicity of the president.
The fact that the majority of districts who are never coethnic with any president
across the 1963-2011 period, but which nonetheless contain the bulk (around 85%) of
the Kenyan population, get road spending allocations well below the national average
during periods of autocracy and at best achieve parity during democratic periods is very
di¢ cult to square with any notion that road spending across districts being is being
driven by concerns with economic e¢ ciency.19
4.2.2 Regression Analysis
In Table 1, we move beyond the graphical analysis and employ the regression framework
specied above. In Panel A of Table 1, Column 1 conrms that, for our 1963-2011 period
as a whole, there is strong evidence of ethnic favoritism in Kenya. A coe¢ cient of 1 in
this specication implies that, on average, districts that are coethnic with the president
19The investment pattern in autocratic periods where other districts consistently receive less road
investment than the national average and Kikuyu and Kalenjin districts receive road investment which
is signicantly above the national average is di¢ cult to square with our theoretical model where the
optimal path of public expenditure equalizes expenditures per capita across districts.
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receive double the amount of roads investment relative to their share in the population.
Recall that the districts with a majority Kikuyu or Kalenjin population each account
for roughly 15% of all Kenyan districts. The coe¢ cient in column 1 implies that, on
average, across our period these districts receive roughly 30% of national spending on
roads. Given that roads account for approximately one sixth of all central government
spending, this represents a highly consequential degree of ethnic bias.
This central result remains robust when we sequentially add controls for demography
(district population, area, urbanization rate  column 2), economic activity (district
total earnings and employment in the formal sector, value of cash crop production for
export column 3), economic geography (being on the main Mombasa-Nairobi-Kampala
corridor, bordering another country, distance to Nairobi column 4). These controls,
which are either time invariant or are measured at the start of our period, are interacted
with linear time trends to allow for initial district di¤erences to evolve over time as a
function of these di¤erences. These interactions should control for many of the economic
factors that might inuence where road investments take place in Kenya. Our preferred
specication is Column 4, which contains the full set of interactions, and has a nearly
identical coe¢ cient estimate to that in column 1, suggesting that ethnic favoritism in
road spending is largely orthogonal to the inuence of these other factors. In column 5
we observe that the ethnic favoritism result is even robust to including district specic
time trends. Regardless of econometric specication, the central result that coethnic
districts, on average, receive twice the level of road expenditure between 1963 and 2011
is highly robust.
We next test if ethnic favoritism is a¤ected by whether a national democratic or
autocratic regime is in place. In Panel B of Table 1, column 1 indicates that ethnic
favoritism in road spending falls signicantly during democratic periods. Indeed the F
test at the bottom of the column indicates that there is no signicant evidence of ethnic
favoritism within periods of democracy in Kenya (p-value = 0.31). This is the second
main result of the paper. Democracy, involving at a minimum some legal competition
between political parties, limits the ability of the president to favor coethnics, in e¤ect
forcing him to share public resources more evenly across the population. This is equi-
valent to a drop in  in our theoretical model towards unity. That even imperfect forms
of democracy, such as that experienced in Kenya in the 1960s and again post-1992, can
reduce ethnic favoritism in this way is a striking nding.
In the remaining columns of Panel B, we see that this second result is robust to
sequentially adding in controls for demography (column 2), economic activity (column
3) and economic geography (column 4). The result is also robust to inclusion of district
specic time trends (column 5). Across all columns, the F -test indicates that we cannot
reject the hypothesis that ethnic favoritism in road building is absent in Kenya during
periods of democracy. The coe¢ cients on coethnicdt tell us that sharing the ethnicity
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of the president in autocratic periods raises road favoritism by 157% to 174%. That is,
there is almost a three fold increase in road spending in these districts relative to those
that do not share the ethnicity of the president. This can be seen in Figure 4 where our
road favoritism measure rises from around 1 in the 1960s to almost 3 in the 1970s and
1980s and then falls back towards 1 in the post-1992 period. The coe¢ cient estimates
of -1.08 to -1.32 on the (coethnicdt democracyt) term captures the near elimination of
ethnic favoritism during periods of democracy.
In Table 2 we use our second roaddt measure, the share of paved roads constructed
in a district relative to the population share of that district according to the digitized
Michelin maps data. Table 2 reproduces all the specications in Table 1. In Panel A we
see that presidential coethnic districts receive between twice and ve times the kilomet-
ers of paved roads per capita relative to national average. In our preferred specication
in column 4, the coe¢ cient is 3.24, implying that coethnic districts have four times the
length of paved roads built. Ethnic favoritism as measured by paved road construction
is therefore twice as pronounced as that measured by total expenditure on roads. One
reason for this might be that paved roads are a highly visible element of road invest-
ment. Political leaders may feel that investing in these visible symbols of progress and
modernity represent a more viable means of securing the support of their coethnics than
investing in less visible elements, such as non-paved tracks or in road maintenance. This
pattern points to favoritism towards coethnics of an extreme form, and is once again
di¢ cult to square with economic e¢ ciency, especially conditional on the wide array of
baseline demographic, geographic and economic characteristics that we include. Our
benchmark that per capita road investment should be equalized across district is clear
violated by the evidence we see for road spending (Table 1) and paved road construction
(Table 2).
In Panel B of Table 2 we see that the tendency to favor coethnic districts with paved
roads is again radically diminished during periods of democracy. Indeed, across all the
specications, we nd that the reduction in this bias during democratic periods is such
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no signicant di¤erence in the extent
to which paved roads are built between coethnic and non-coethnic districts. In column
4 we see that the coe¢ cient on coethnicdt is 3.90, implying that in autocratic periods
ve times the length of paved roads are built in coethnic districts relative to the national
average. A coe¢ cient on (coethnicdt  democracyt) of -2.71 implies that this bias is far
less pronounced in democratic periods and indeed the F -test (p-value = 0.56) conrms
that we cannot reject that there was no ethnic favoritism during these periods. The
coe¢ cient estimates are similar in the specication with district time trends (column 5)
but standard errors rise somewhat.
The degree to which results match up using two independently collected data sets
on road expenditure (Table 1) and road building (Table 2) is reassuring. It increases
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our condence in the robustness of the two key ndings of this paper: there is extens-
ive favoritism towards the presidents coethnics in road investment in Kenya, and this
favoritism is eliminated during periods of democracy.
4.2.3 Robustness
Table 3 checks the robustness of these results to changes in normalization and in meas-
ures of coethnicity. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A replicate the key results for road
expenditure (from column 4 of Table 1). In columns 1 and 2 of Panel B we move to a
continuous measure of coethnicity, where we measure the population share of the presid-
ents ethnicity in a district, independent of whether or not this represents the majority
(>50%) ethnicity. The two main results hold when we do this. In columns 3 and 4 of
Panel A we normalize the road expenditure share by the districts area share. It is clear
that the two main results are robust to normalizing road expenditure by area share as
opposed to population share. In columns 5 through 8, we show that our road building
results are robust to using a continuous measure of coethnicity and to normalizing by
area share. Across all the results in Table 3, we nd that there is strong evidence of
ethnic favoritism in road spending and building, and we cannot reject the hypothesis
that this favoritism is largely eliminated during periods of democracy.
In Appendix Table 3, we carry out a further battery of robustness checks on our
main results on road spending. Column 1 replicates the results from our preferred
specication in column 4 of Table 1. In column 2, we see that including our baseline
controls on demography, economic activity and economic geography interacted with year
xed e¤ects does not signicantly a¤ect our results, although coe¢ cient estimates are
less precisely estimated. In column 3 we include an additional control for the number
of years that a district has been coethnic with the president, to capture the possible
persistence of e¤ects of coethnicity on road favoritism. Our results remain robust to
the inclusion of this control. In columns 4 and 5 we compute standard errors that are
corrected for spatial clustering (Conley, 1999) using 200 kilometer and 400 kilometer
thresholds, respectively. Again the pattern of results seen in column 1 remain robust.
It is informative to break down the results into the ve leadership periods seen in
Figure 2 Kenyatta democracy, Kenyatta autocracy, Moi autocracy, Moi democracy,
Kibaki democracy. This is needed to check whether what we are observing is a general
phenomena, or one related to a particular leadership regime in Kenya. For example,
we would want to know whether both early (1960s) and later (1990s, 2000s) democracy
were e¤ective in mitigating ethnic favoritism. To look at this, for each of the leadership
regimes shown in Figure 2, we regress our road spending favoritism index roaddt on
indicators that capture whether a district has a majority (>50%) Kikuyu or Kalenjin
population. The comparison districts are those that do not have either of these attrib-
utes. The results are reported in Table 4.
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The comparison of the coe¢ cients on Kikuyu/Kalenjin indicators across periods of
democracy and autocracy when the same Kikuyu or Kalenjin president is in power is
telling. During the Kenyatta democracy period (1963-1969), there is no signicant di¤er-
ence between the coe¢ cients on the Kikuyu and Kalenjin indicators (p-value = 0.70). In
the Kenyatta autocracy period (1970-1978) the Kikuyu indicator becomes positive and
statistically signicant, and the Kikuyu-Kalenjin di¤erence is also statistically signic-
ant (p-value = 0.01). During the Moi autocracy period (1979-1992), things ip round
and now the Kalenjin indicator is positive and statistically signicant, the Kikuyu in-
dicator is not and the two are marginally signicantly di¤erent (p-value = 0.08). With
the transition back to democracy during the Moi democracy period (1993-2002), both
indicators lose statistical signicance, as does the di¤erence between the two (p-value =
0.14) and this pattern also holds under the Kibaki democracy period (2003-2011, p-value
= 0.33). The results in Table 4 indicate that there is no evidence of ethnic favoritism in
either the early (1960s) or later (1990s, 2000s) democratic periods. It is during periods
of autocracy that presidents are able to favor coethnics in the allocation of road spending
across Kenyan districts.
4.2.4 Extension: Coalition Politics
Our focus has been on the impact of being coethnic with the president on road spend-
ing and paved road construction within a district, and on whether this changes under
democracy. This makes sense given the nature of politics in many Sub-Saharan African
countries, where presidents traditionally enjoy considerable personal decision-making
authority. However, it is possible that other members of the presidents cabinet also in-
uence where road investment takes place. This introduces a set of related but distinct
issues pertaining to inter-ethnic coalition formation. While a full treatment of these
issues is beyond the scope of this paper, and does not feature in our theoretical model in
section 2, we use our data to explore whether considering coalition politics signicantly
changes any of our main conclusions.
We assembled a data set that codes the ethnicity of each cabinet member for each of
the thirteen central government cabinets between 1963 and 2011 (see Appendix Table 1).
In an exhaustive set of regressions, we tested whether districts that are coethnic with the
Public Works minister, or with ministers holding the most important cabinet portfolios
(e.g., Finance, Home) receive more road spending but cannot reject the hypothesis that
the e¤ect is zero (not shown). This appears to be further conrmation of the overriding
power of presidents in post-independence Kenya.
However, in column 2 of Table 5 we show the one exception: we nd that districts
that are coethnic with the vice president do have road expenditures signicantly above
the national average. A coe¢ cient of 1.46 on the V P -coethnicdt measure tells us that
during autocratic periods, districts receive two and a half times the average amount of
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road expenditure relative to their population share, a large e¤ect. The coe¢ cient of
-1.42 on (V P -coethnicdtdemocracy) implies that this ethnic favoritism is non-existent
during periods of democracy, as is also conrmed by the F -test in column 2. What is
also interesting in column 2 is that, during autocratic periods, districts that are coethnic
with the president receive three and half times the amount of road expenditure relative
to districts that are neither coethnic with the president or vice president. This nding
conrms that the president has been the dominant force in allocating road spending, but
also shows that the vice president (who throughout the post-independence period was
never of the same ethnicity as the president) is able, to a more limited extent, to skew
resources towards districts that share his ethnicity. The fact that both these forms of
favoritism largely disappear during democratic periods suggest that democracy ties the
hands of both top executives, the president and the vice president. In other words, our
main results on ethnic favoritism and the leveling e¤ect of democracy are robust to also
considering the ethnic group of the vice president.
It is often argued that the typical way coalition politics play out in African politics is
in cabinet formation. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 we explore this possibility. To do so,
we exploit our data set on the ethnicity of all cabinet ministers for election years between
1963 and 2011 (see Appendix Table 1). The dependent variable is the cabinet share of
each ethnic group in year t divided by its population share in 1962. An index higher
than one means that an ethnic group is receiving more cabinet positions than its national
ethnic population share would predict. We then regress this index on a district indicator
which equals one if it is coethnic with the serving president, as well as its interaction
with the democracy indicator. We include ethnic group and time xed e¤ects, as well
as an ethnic group time trend. In column 3 of Table 5 we nd that the presidents
ethnic group receives 64% more cabinet posts relative to what would be predicted by its
national population share. Therefore, Kenyan presidents do favor their ethnic group with
cabinet positions. When we interact the group indicator with democracyt, however, we
nd no e¤ect, indicating that the propensity to favor coethnics with cabinet positions is
not attenuated during periods of democracy. In column 4 we see that the ethnic groups
of both the president and vice president are favored with cabinet positions but that once
again that neither is a¤ected by democracy. This is informative in two respects. First,
there is indeed a propensity for presidents and vice-presidents to stu¤ the cabinet
with coethnics. Second, this tendency is not checked by the arrival of democracy, which
suggests that the road favoritism e¤ects across autocratic and democratic periods we are
estimating are unlikely to be driven by changes in cabinet composition.
These ndings line up well with Francois, Rainer and Trebbi (2012), who argue that
cabinets in Africa are surprisingly representative of the underlying national population
even under autocratic regimes. They argue that allocating key cabinet posts to eth-
nic groups that are not coethnic with the president may help to reduce the threat of
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revolutions from outsiders and of coups from insiders. Despite the largesse shown by
the president in allocating cabinet posts to ethnic groups other than his own, what our
results show is that it has primarily been the president (and to some extent the vice
president) who retains the power to allocate public roads resources in Kenya, and it is
democracy that ultimately constrains that power, rather than any shift toward a more
representative cabinet.
4.3 Interpretation
In our model,  captures the ability of the executive to discriminate across ethnic groups.
If  = 1 then all ethnic groups receive a public good allocation equal to the average per
capita allocation and ethnic favoritism is therefore eliminated. If  = 1, then the
executive is unconstrained as regards the extent to which public good allocation to
his ethnic group can exceed the average allocation. By transforming the di¤erent 
coe¢ cient estimates from Table 4 into the analogous values of  from our theoretical
model namely,  = 1 + (1   A) we can trace the evolution of  across the ve
periods shown in Figure 2: Kenyatta democracy, Kenyatta autocracy, Moi autocracy,
Moi democracy, and Kibaki democracy.20 The results from doing this are presented
graphically in Figure 6. We also include the Polity IV score for Kenya from Figure 1 in
this gure.21
There is a remarkable correspondence between these two measures over time. The
early democratic period in the 1960s was characterized by relative democratic freedoms,
and essentially no evidence of ethnic favoritism towards President Kenyattas Kikuyu
ethnic group, with the estimated  near 1. However, there is a sharp increase in 
after 1970, when multiparty democracy was abandoned, with  moving higher towards a
value of 2. Polity scores move in tandem dropping precipitously around 1970, signalling
a collapse in democratic freedoms, and staying low until the early 1990s.  moves even
higher during the rule of President Mois single-party rule (1979-1992), reaching 2.5,
implying that the presidents coethnic districts received a staggering two and half times
more road funds on average than other groups. However,  moves back towards 1 when
democracy was restored in late 1991 and ends up nearly equal to 1, indicating that
there is e¤ectively no ethnic favoritism in the most recent period, which is the most
democratic on record for post-independence Kenya. Polity scores also rise sharply in
the early 1990s, signalling a return to democratic freedoms, and actually, by the 2000s,
achieve levels which exceed those seen in the 1960s. Figure 6 thus indicates that,
during the autocratic 1970s and 1980s, presidents are less constrained in their ability to
skew road spending towards coethnic districts relative to the democratic 1960s, 1990s
20A captures the population share of the ethnic group which is coethnic with the serving president.
This value varies across periods as the presidents ethnicity changes.
21Note that the  score is presented with a reverse axis to facilitate comparison with the democracy
score.
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and 2000s. The value of democracy lies in its ability to tie the hands of presidents so
that they cannot allocate public resources in a way seems inconsistent with economic
e¢ ciency.
The co-movement of  and the polity measure of democracy in Figure 6 begs the
question of what underlies the changes in . Digging into the various components of
the polity measure (and its e¤ect on triggering other changes in society) can shed some
light into the institutional changes occurring in Kenya during its political transitions.22
Closer examination of Figure 6 reveals that the combined polity score decreased from 0
to -7 in the transition out of democracy during Kenyattas leadership. Almost all sub-
components of the score changed at that time: competitiveness and openness of executive
recruitment worsened (there was only one party now, whose leader was chosen for life),
constraints on the chief executive weakened (the O¢ ce of the President could generally
bypass parliament), regulation of political participation became restrictive (participation
was restricted to life members of the single-party and civil society was heavily repressed)
and competitiveness of participation was eliminated (there was only one candidate for
the executive seat). It is little wonder that presidents under this regime felt free to
allocate resources largely as they wished.
The repeal of the constitution and the political institutional change of 1991 (when
Moi allowed multiparty democracy) led the combined polity score to improve from -7
to -5 and up to -2 in 1997 as parties were allowed to compete and KANUs tight grip
on civil society gradually loosened (this process increased scores on both regulation and
competitiveness of political participation). This movement from -7 to -2 represents a very
signicant improvement in fundamental democratic freedoms.23 After the democratic
presidential transition of 2002 other components of the polity score improve and push
the overall polity sharply higher to around 8 which is in the fully democratic range but
below the scores one would observe in mature democracies. Our estimated  matches
this path: from 1992 to 2002, the estimated  equals 1:75 but this drops to 1:08 after
2002. 1:75 represents a signicant increase in constraints on the executive relative to the
Moi autocratic years ( = 2:56) but falls short of the more fully constrained post 2002
setting ( = 1:08) where ethnic favoritism has e¤ectively been eliminated.
It is important to note that the development of Kenyas civil society played a key role
in the institutional evolution that began in the early 1990s. A simple plot of the Freedom
House Freedom of the Press Index reveals that both press freedom and broadcast freedom
22The combined polity score is computed by subtracting the polity AUTOC score from the DEMOC
score, the resulting scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Each of
the two components have their sub-components. AUTOC and DEMOC are constructed additively on a
eleven-point scale. Further, the individual sub-components are weighted di¤erently and are derived from
coding the following 5 sub-components (i) the competitiveness of political participation (ii) regulation
of participation, (iii) the openness and (iv) competitiveness of executive recruitment and (v) constraints
on the chief executive (see the Data Appendix for further details).
23Kenya during this period is classied by polity as an anocracywhich is political regime akin to a
limited democracy.
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jumped from not freeto partly freewhen the switch to multiparty politics occurred
(not shown). Indeed, the period since 1990 saw an increase in independent weekly
magazines that often took anti-government stances. Similarly, in the early 1990s several
inuential private newspapers, including the The Nation and The Standard, emerged.
This active opposition media survived the aggressive reaction of the Moi regime thanks
to widespread societal support, as well as Western donor protests against governmental
abuse.
Broadcast media on the other hand remained more rmly in the governments grip, at
least at rst. While the Kenya Broadcasting Company was o¢ cially semi-autonomous,
the O¢ ce of the President retained considerable editorial control. Its main competitor,
the Kenya Television Network, also su¤ered from constant interference from the State.
Independent commercial broadcasting did not emerge in Kenya during this early period,
as more than 20 TV broadcast applications submitted between 1985-1995 were rejected.
The situation was similar for radio, a major source of information for the rural majority,
which saw no independent radio licenses granted until 1996.
The period since 1998, however, saw the government end direct censorship of the
media, and by 2000, Kenya had nine private TV stations and 19 radio stations. While
state harassment has not totally disappeared (libel cases are common and harassment
of journalists and editors still occurs) it is undeniable that the media has become much
freer since the early 1990s.
Beyond the vital emergence of private media, several other aspects of civil society
helped to challenge the executives absolute authority. The number of non-governmental
organizations (NGO) grew rapidly in the 1990s. While Kenyan law does not allow
international donors to fund opposition political parties, they could fund governance-
focused civil society organizations (e.g. USAID funded pro-democracyNGOs that in
practice had strong opposition leanings). Western bilateral agencies and foundations also
increasingly side-stepped the government in terms of resource allocation and distribution,
and by the late 1990s, Kenya had the highest concentration of NGOs per capita in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The churches (often in tandem with NGOs) also played a crucial role in
giving voice to the need for impartial conduct of elections and voter registration reforms
in the 1990s.
A freer press and a stronger civil society, together with Western pressure, made
Moi realize that he had to accommodate demands for further openness. This brought
about three key reforms in 1997, the so-called Inter-Parliamentary Parties Group (IPPG)
reforms. The IPPG reforms reduced state internal security powers (e.g. preventative de-
tention) and amended the Public Order, Broadcasting, and Societies Acts.24 The reform
24Reduced state authority implied an end to preventative detention and sedition laws. The Public
Orders Act was amended to remove the need for a license before meetings, replacing it with a need to
notify the police (three days before). The Broadcasting Act was also changed to provide free airtime to
all parties and to promote a balanced show of opinions. The Societies Act was amended to require the
registrar to respond reasonably to all requests for voter registration within 120 days.
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package also contained amendments to electoral rules, explicitly classifying falsication
of voter registration, destruction, and sale of voting cards, as criminal o¤enses. The nal
years of the Moi regime also saw a rise in the power of parliament, with constitutional
amendments that increased its independence from the executive branch.
All in all, key political institutional changes in the early 1990s set the stage for the
emergence of an active civil society and a freer press which became strong proponents of
further institutional change that ultimately curtailed the machinery of Mois autocratic
state and allowed for a push towards a more democratic Kenya. This evolution has
continued since Moi stepped down in late 2002. A new constitution was ratied by
voters in 2010 which altered the division of powers between the central government and
newly created (and popularly elected) county governments, as well as consolidating a
more independent judiciary. Nowadays, Kenyas increasingly well-informed, educated,
and connected population is consistently politically engaged. Parliamentary debates are
increasingly shown on national TV and discussion forums are held to allow for civil
society feedback. Misguided public investments and corruption remain widespread but
are more regularly bought to light by the press (Wrong 2009).
It is hardly surprising that the practice of ethnic favoritism in public resource alloc-
ation is now much more di¢ cult to carry out than in the past. Ethnic divisions have
not disappeared, and they remain highly politically salient, as tragically demonstrated
in the post-election violence in 2007/2008. However, tight scrutiny from a free press, a
vocal civil society and an independent parliament all severely curtail the ability of the
executive to blatantly discriminate between di¤erent districts in choosing where to place
roads projects. This is succinctly captured in our estimated  = 1:08 for the post-2002
period.
5 Conclusion
For ethnic favoritism to be a viable political strategy the president must be able to
manipulate the allocation of public expenditure with few constraints. Ethnic favoritism
and weak controls on the chief executive thus go hand in hand. As democracy becomes
consolidated in many low-income countries, including many in Sub-Saharan Africa, not
only does political competition become better regulated, but the constraints on executive
action are also strengthened due to the scrutiny that parliament and civil society are
able to exercise. In this paper we examine this logic in detail by asking two empirical
questions. First, can we detect quantitative evidence of ethnic favoritism in an African
country? Second, does the transition into and out of democracy under the same leader
exacerbate or constrain this ethnic favoritism?
Though many of Africas ills have been blamed on ethnic favoritism, it has been
surprisingly di¢ cult to nd concrete evidence of this behavior, mostly due to lack of
data. Therefore, to address these questions we construct two new datasets through the
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geographic coding of road project data and through the innovative use of historical maps.
We are helped in this respect by the fact that each Kenyan district is dominated by a
particular ethnic group, which allows us to precisely assign expenditures or road length
to ethnic groups. In answering the second question, we are helped by the fact that there
have been multiple switches of power between leaders of di¤erent ethnic groups in Kenya
and, within each ethnic regime, switches between democracy and autocracy.
There are two main empirical results. First, central government investments in roads
across Kenyan districts have been subject to a very high degree of ethnic favoritism, with
districts coethnic to the President receiving three times the average expenditure in roads
and ve times the length of paved roads during periods of autocracy. Second, that both
these biases disappear entirely during periods of multiparty democracy.
As we discuss in the introduction, numerous scholars link ethnic favoritism to poor
economic outcomes. Taking this link as given, we would expect that in periods of demo-
cracy, when we estimate ethnic favoritism to be non-existent, the economic performance
of Kenya should be better than in periods of autocracy, when we nd ethnic favoritism
to be highly pronounced. Figure 7 suggests that this is the case. Per capita growth rates
in Kenya fell towards zero during autocratic periods (1970s, 1980s). This was also the
case in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, per capita growth rates were positive
during democratic periods (1960s, 1990s and 2000s) both in Kenya and in Sub-Saharan
Africa as a whole. What is also striking in Figure 7 is that the collapse in growth (in the
early 1970s) coincides with the spread of autocracy across Africa whereas the return to
growth (for both Kenya and Sub-Saharan Africa) begins the early 1990s precisely when
democracy is spreading across the continent (see Figure 1).
In a speculative exercise, we conclude by exploring whether democracy does appear
to mitigate the negative e¤ects of ethnic divisions on economic performance. We follow
an inuential article, Easterly and Levine (1997), which attributes much of the poor
economic performance seen in Sub-Saharan Africa up until the end of the 1980s to the
political frictions and economic mismanagement associated with ethnic fractionalization.
More specically, we take a second look at the data to see if the cross-country correlation
between ethnic fractionalization and growth that Easterly and Levine (1997) uncover
varies as a function of the spread of democracy.
The results are presented in Table 6. In column 1, we replicate the key result from
Easterly and Levine (1997) using data from the 1960s to the 1980s for the whole world.
More specically we nd, as they established, that ethnic diversity is negatively asso-
ciated with economic growth. Column 2 extends the Easterly-Levine data set to the
2000s and shows that this relationship is weaker when the whole period is taken into
account. In column 3 we test whether the association between ethnic fractionalization
and economic growth varies with the presence of democracy. The results are striking:
while the negative, statistically signicant, relationship still holds for autocracies, there
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is no association between ethnic fractionalization and economic growth in democracies.
Column 4 shows that if we restrict the sample to Africa not only does this continue to
be the case but the interaction between ethnic fractionalization and democracy also be-
comes positive and statistically signicant, suggesting that democracy serves to largely
eliminate the negative growth e¤ects of ethnic diversity, thus paralleling our ndings for
Kenya.
Obviously, these results should not be taken as causal, since democratization is clearly
correlated with other important changes and is far from randomly assigned. Nonethe-
less, we view these patterns as thought-provoking, and as suggestive of the relevance
of our empirical results beyond ethnic favoritism in Kenya. Ethnic divisions appear
to contribute to poor economic policies (and consequently contribute to poor economic
performance) when political institutions are su¢ ciently weak that politicians can exploit
ethnic fractionalization for their own benet. Yet ethnic divisions cease to be a salient
problem for economic performance under democracy. These results are consistent with
a view that democracy helps countries limit downside political risk.
The ndings also highlight some useful avenues for future research. First, while we
nd that multiparty democracy dampens ethnic favoritism, it is not clear which particu-
lar institutional dimension is most critical for this result. Is this simply a consequence of
heightened electoral competition, or are the strong civil society and free press that sim-
ultaneously took root in Kenya also important? Second, it is important to consider the
relevance of the observability of the public good in question for our results. Roads are
highly salient and observable investments, and this is relevant in at least two ways. On
the one hand, roads are prime targets for favoritism, because it is easy for a politician to
point to them and take credit for them. On the other hand, it is also easy for opposition
parliamentarians, the media and civil society groups to spot blatant imbalances in the
allocation of these large infrastructure investments, which might make the allocation of
roads particularly sensitive to democratic reform. The lower degree of observability for
some other public investments, such as those in education or health, might lead them to
be less responsive to the institutional changes wrought by democratization.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Political Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1963-2011
Notes: This figure plots the revised combined polity score for Sub-Saharan Africa (average) and Kenya. Polity IV
defines three regime categories: autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to +5) and democracies (+6 to +10). The
vertical lines represent regime changes in Kenya: December 1969 is the transition from democracy to autocracy,
while December 1992 is the return of democracy. Source: authors’ calculations and Polity IV Project, Political
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2011. See Online Data Appendix for data sources.
Figure 2: History Timeline of Political and Leadership Transitions
Notes: This figure shows the history timeline of political transitions and leadership transitions. Political tran-
sitions: December 1969 is the transition from democracy to autocracy, while December 1992 is the return of
democracy. Leadership transitions: from Kenyatta (Kikuyu) to Moi (Kalenjin) in August 1978, and from Moi
(Kalenjin) to Kibaki (Kikuyu) in December 2002.
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Figure 4: Road Investment in Coethnic and Non-Coethnic Districts, 1963-2011
Notes: This figure plots the ratio of the share of road development expenditure in year t to the share of population
in 1962 for coethnic and non-coethnic districts d. A district d is defined as coethnic if more than 50% of its
population is from the ethnic group of the president at time t. The two vertical solid lines represent political
transitions: December 1969 is the transition from democracy to autocracy, while December 1992 is the return
of democracy. The two vertical dotted lines represent leadership transitions: from Kenyatta (Kikuyu) to Moi
(Kalenjin) in August 1978, and from Moi (Kalenjin) to Kibaki (Kikuyu) in December 2002. See Appendix Table
2 and Online Data Appendix for data sources.
Figure 5: Road Investment in Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Other Districts, 1963-2011
Notes: This figure plots the ratio of the share of road development expenditure in year t to the share of population
in 1962 for coethnic and non-coethnic districts d. Coethnic districts are as defined in figure 3, except they are now
disaggregate into the two different leading groups. The president is Kikuyu during 1963-1978, Kalenjin during
1978-2002 and Kikuyu during 2002-2011. A district is defined as Kikuyu (Kalenjin) if more than 50% of its
population is Kikuyu (Kalenjin). The vertical lines represent political transitions, while the vertical dotted lines
represent leadership transitions (see figure 3). See Appendix Table 2 and Online Data Appendix for data sources.
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Figure 6: Ethnic Favoritism and Political Regimes in Kenya, 1963-2011
Notes: This figure plots theta, our estimate of ethnic favoritism, and the revised combined polity score for Kenya
annually from 1963 to 2011. The two vertical solid lines represent political transitions: December 1969 is the
transition from democracy to autocracy, while December 1992 is the return of democracy. Source: authors’
calculations and Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2011. See Online
Data Appendix for data sources.
Figure 7: Evolution of GDP per capita growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1963-2011
Notes: This figure plots GDP per capita growth (%) for Sub-Saharan Africa (average) and Kenya. We take a
5-year moving average to smooth fluctuations. The vertical lines represent regime changes in Kenya: December
1969 is the transition from democracy to autocracy, while December 1992 is the return of democracy. See Online
Data Appendix for data sources.
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d
e
th
e
sa
m
e
co
n
tr
o
ls
a
s
in
th
e
co
lu
m
n
(1
)
o
f
T
a
b
le
IV
o
f
E
L
9
7
–
“
In
d
ic
a
to
r
fo
r
th
e
1
9
6
0
s”
,
“
In
d
ic
a
to
r
fo
r
th
e
1
9
7
0
s”
,
“
In
d
ic
a
to
r
fo
r
th
e
1
9
8
0
s”
,
“
In
d
ic
a
to
r
V
a
ri
a
b
le
fo
r
S
u
b
-S
a
h
a
ra
n
A
fr
ic
a
”
,
“
In
d
ic
a
to
r
V
a
ri
a
b
le
fo
r
L
a
ti
n
A
m
er
ic
a
a
n
d
th
e
C
a
ri
b
b
ea
n
”
,
“
L
o
g
o
f
In
it
ia
l
In
co
m
e”
,
“
(L
o
g
o
f
In
it
ia
l
In
co
m
e)
S
q
u
a
re
d
”
–
w
it
h
th
e
ex
ce
p
ti
o
n
o
f
“
L
o
g
o
f
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
”
,
b
ec
a
u
se
o
f
th
e
h
ig
h
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s,
es
p
ec
ia
ll
y
fo
r
A
fr
ic
a
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
(4
),
w
e
ru
n
th
e
sa
m
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
a
s
in
co
lu
m
n
(3
)
fo
r
3
8
S
u
b
-S
a
h
a
ra
n
A
fr
ic
a
n
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
o
n
ly
.
T
h
e
F
-t
es
t
is
u
se
d
to
te
st
th
e
n
u
ll
h
y
p
o
th
es
is
o
f
jo
in
t
eq
u
a
li
ty
b
et
w
ee
n
a
fr
a
ct
io
n
a
li
ze
d
a
n
d
a
n
o
n
-f
ra
ct
io
n
a
li
ze
d
co
u
n
tr
y
d
u
ri
n
g
d
em
o
cr
a
cy
.
S
ee
O
n
li
n
e
D
a
ta
A
p
p
en
d
ix
fo
r
d
a
ta
so
u
rc
es
a
n
d
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
o
f
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s.
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